



# 2020 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

SENEGAL  
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# **2020 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION SUSTAINABILITY INDEX**

For Senegal  
November 2021

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United States Agency for International Development  
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
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# SENEGAL

Capital: Dakar  
Population: 16,082,442  
GDP per capita (PPP): \$3,395  
Human Development Index: Low (0.512)  
Freedom in the World: Partly Free (71/100)

## OVERALL CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.2



On March 23, 2020, approximately twenty days after the first case of COVID-19 was confirmed in Senegal, the Senegalese government issued Decree No. 2020-830 declaring a state of emergency. As part of its pandemic response, the government closed schools and markets, introduced a night-time curfew, made the wearing of face masks mandatory, and restricted interregional travel. The government also implemented quick testing and quarantine protocols. International observers credited this energetic response and consistent public messaging about the virus with effectively mitigating the disease. However, after three months, demonstrations broke out in many cities against the pandemic measures, which forced authorities to relax and eventually repeal them.

The government also created the Response and Solidarity Fund against the Effects of COVID-19 (Force COVID-19) to help strengthen the health-care system and provide financial support to households, the Senegalese diaspora, and companies and their employees. Backed by public resources and contributions from national and international donors, the fund had an initial endowment of XOF 1 trillion (\$1.7 billion), representing about 7 percent of the national gross domestic product. CSOs served on the committee overseeing the fund, and in a meeting with CSOs, the president stressed the importance of harnessing their expertise to plan and implement the national pandemic response. The president also seemed to expect CSOs to help mobilize resources for Force COVID-19. However, CSOs and social enterprises did not benefit from the fund or receive other government funding for the many pandemic-related services that they provided in 2020. Some advocacy organizations felt that the government's pandemic measures were too restrictive and prevented them from exercising their watchdog role.

Departmental and municipal elections that were originally scheduled for June 2019 and then postponed to December 1, 2020, were postponed again until March 2021. The delay was meant to give the Political Commission of the National Dialogue Steering Committee under the Ministry of Interior time to oversee an audit of the electoral roll and evaluate the election process. CSOs were represented on the commission by two CSO coalitions, the Collective of CSOs for Elections (COSCE) and the Platform of Civil Society Actors for Transparency in Elections (PACTE). These coalitions played a major role in achieving consensus on such issues as the election of local officials by direct universal suffrage and the abolition of sponsorships for local elections.


After a period of sustained growth averaging 6 percent over the last six years, the pandemic inflicted a major blow on the Senegalese economy. The gross domestic product was estimated by the African Development Bank to have contracted by 0.7 percent in 2020 as the virus disrupted vital sectors such as catering, fishing, trade, handicrafts, education, and transportation. More than one-third of the population lives below the poverty line, and 75 percent of families suffer from chronic poverty, according to the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme.

CSO sustainability in Senegal did not change in 2020. The legal environment was slightly weaker as civic space was constrained by pandemic-related restrictions and CSO activists and leaders were subject to increased harassment. CSOs' organizational capacity deteriorated slightly because of the sector's lack of preparation to deal with the

pandemic. Their financial viability was moderately undermined by changing levels of external funding and minimal domestic sources of funding. CSOs' sectoral infrastructure deteriorated slightly because of weak support from resource centers and intermediary support organizations. CSO advocacy, service provision, and public image did not change.

The Ministry of Interior has not made data about the number of CSOs available for several years. Registered CSOs are estimated to include more than 10,000 associations and 589 non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many unregistered organizations are also active.

## LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.1



The legal environment for CSOs deteriorated slightly in 2020 as civic space was constrained by pandemic-related restrictions, while harassment of CSO leaders and activists increased.

Associations are governed by Article 8 of the 2001 constitution, which guarantees fundamental freedoms, and Article 12, which guarantees the right to freely form associations, companies, and other groups. In addition, the Code of Civil and Commercial Obligations specifies criteria for associations to obtain legal status and corporate purpose, and Decree 96-103 defines associations as private nonprofit organizations whose purpose is to support Senegal's development.

Associations must obtain legal personality to operate, be eligible for funding from the government and

international partners, and open bank accounts. The registration process is usually bureaucratic and slow, since the interministerial advisory commission that approves applications rarely meets. In 2020, the approval process was unusually protracted because of the pandemic.

After two years of operation, associations may apply for NGO status, which confers eligibility for tax and customs waivers under Decree 2015-145. NGOs must submit annual reports for evaluation by interministerial commissions, which also approve CSOs' spending plans, including their sources of financial support, which must be traceable. In 2020, the interministerial commissions, which met virtually because of pandemic restrictions, approved fourteen requests for NGO status and thirty-seven spending plans. Foreign organizations that needed to renew their headquarters agreements experienced difficulties in 2020 because the commission overseeing the agreements under the Ministry of Interior has not met to review pending applications since 2018.

The space for civil society shrank rapidly in 2020 as CSO leaders, whistleblowers, and human rights defenders were increasingly threatened and prosecuted. Sporadic human rights violations were reported, as when security and defense forces used excessive force to enforce the curfew in localities such as Touba, Mbacké, and Dakar in March. In response to multiple testimonies from victims and video recordings posted on social networks and the media, police authorities issued a statement acknowledging "excessive interventions in [their] ranks." Several activists from the movements Noo Lank (We Refuse), Fed Up (Y'en a marre), Front for a Popular and Pan-African Anti-Imperialist Revolution (Front pour une révolution anti-impérialiste populaire et panafricaine, FRAPP-France dégage), Aar Li NuBokk (Preserve Our Common Good), and other groups were arrested for engaging in activities such as distributing flyers and protesting the lack of transparency in the award of contracts for exploiting oil and gas reserves. For example, in March 2020, a member of both Noo Lank and FRAPP-France dégage was detained for three months for taking part in a demonstration against rising electricity prices. In December 2020, two activists from Noo Lank were taken into custody and brought before the criminal court for "participating in a banned demonstration and failing to obey an officer" while trying to notify the prefecture of Dakar of their intention to hold a sit-in against an agreement on fisheries between Senegal and the European Union (EU). They were freed after four days. Demonstrations were systematically banned on the grounds of "real threats of public disorder," "incitement to violence through irreverent language," and "risk of infiltration by ill-intentioned individuals."

CSOs continued to be required to file yearly tax returns and pay corporate taxes as well as taxes on behalf of their employees. NGOs are entitled to exemptions from taxes and customs fees on supplies and equipment used for activities included in their spending plans approved by the government. The process for obtaining these exemptions is slow. International CSOs may sign agreements with the government to obtain tax advantages. CSOs that sign paid consulting service contracts with the government must pay taxes on this income. In 2020, CSOs were often subjected to formal notices of tax adjustments or violations of rules related to their financing.

CSOs may bid on government contracts and may earn income by selling goods and services and operating social enterprises, provided the profits are used to support their missions.

Legal professionals in Dakar and smaller cities help with CSOs' legal needs. Human rights CSOs, including the African Meeting for the Defense of Human Rights (Rencontre africaine pour la défense des droits de l'homme, RADDHO), Amnesty International, and Association of Senegalese Jurists (Association des juristes sénégalaises, AJS) often have legal experts on their staff, who, usually on a pro bono basis, assist CSOs that cannot afford to pay for legal services or otherwise lack access to private-sector professionals.

## ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.2

The organizational capacity of Senegalese CSOs deteriorated slightly in 2020 as the sector proved unprepared to deal technically or organizationally with the sudden changes that the pandemic caused in their operational environment.

The pandemic forced CSOs to change course quickly to meet new needs while dealing with travel restrictions and health issues. Their ability to reorient their planning and redeploy funding individually or in partnerships varied considerably. For example, GRET-Senegal and its partners Enda Graf Sahel and Fodde suspended field-based vocational training planned under the Qualemploi project and, after consulting with their funder, the European Union (EU), were able to develop a contingency plan to promote preventative measures. The consortium supported the Chamber of Trades by supplying hygienic products such as soap and bleach and installing hand-washing stations to use when training young people. Some local and community-based organizations (CBOs) such as Ndeyjirim, Alphadev, and Youth and Development (Jeunesse et développement, JED), along with national CSOs such as Democracy, Human Rights, and Development (ONG démocratie, droits humains, développement, ONG 3D), Union for Solidarity and Mutual Aid (Union pour la solidarité et l'entraide, USE), African Network for Integrated Development (Réseau africain pour le développement intégré, RADl), and Enda Santé, were also able to adjust their activities in consultation with their technical and financial partners and target groups.

But many CSOs, particularly international organizations, had to abruptly halt their interventions, leaving communities without critical services in areas such as health care, education, water, sanitation, and human rights. Some international CSOs reduced their staff after restrictions were introduced on travel and in-person meetings. For example, the Center for International Studies and Cooperation (Centre d'étude et de coopération internationale, CECI) suspended implementation of its Women's Voice and Leadership program, funded by the Canadian government, which had planned to bring together twenty organizations and five networks to defend the rights of women and girls.

For some organizations and networks, the pandemic offered an opportunity to reinvent organizational and community strategies for the post-pandemic period. For example, the Platform of European NGOs in Senegal (Plateforme des ONG européennes au Sénégal, PFONGUE) set up inter-CSO stakeholder working groups comprised of national and international organizations, which conducted analyses and offered concrete proposals for social inclusion, the territorialization of public policies, and sustainable development. This consultative process provided an opportunity to bring together CSOs, technical and financial partners, national and local institutions,

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY IN SENEGAL



the private sector, and other development stakeholders in discussions about ways to strengthen CSOs' resilience and the country's economic and social recovery in the post-pandemic period.

CSOs' governance and internal management was disrupted as most organizations were poorly prepared to work remotely during the pandemic. Although administrative managers working in offices were usually able to adapt quickly to remote work, operational management and field and community workers found the transition difficult or even impossible because of the nature of their work. Many CSOs were unable to afford the costs of additional equipment so that their staff could work from home, which increased the capacity gaps between international organizations, national CSOs, and CBOs.

## FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.1



CSOs' financial viability deteriorated moderately in 2020 as their dependence on changing levels of foreign funding coupled with minimal domestic sources of funding increased their financial vulnerability.

The majority of funds come from international donors, including USAID, the EU, and the French Agency for Development. Several other bilateral organizations, including the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and Japan International Cooperation Agency, and multilateral institutions such as the UN, African Development Bank, and World Bank have smaller civil society funding programs that target specific sectors or local infrastructure projects. While precise data on declines in funding due to the pandemic are difficult to obtain, most CSOs felt that funding levels were unstable

and unpredictable in 2020. For example, some donors suspended their funding programs when the foreign staff of international CSOs departed, while other donors redirected funds from their usual programs to the pandemic response. USAID, for instance, asked its implementing partners to re-channel funds intended for activities under the Sunu Election and Governance for Local Development programs to pandemic awareness-raising campaigns and the distribution of masks and hand sanitizer.

Senegalese CSOs often compete against each other rather than work together to respond to calls for proposals. Many local CSOs are dependent on a single donor.

Financial support from central and local governments remains limited to non-existent, especially for NGOs, for which there are no legal provisions regarding government funding. In 2020, Force COVID-19 did not extend subsidies or recovery plans to CSOs or social enterprises. Some CSOs act as partners with the government through service contracts under programs in education, health care, water, sanitation, and governance funded by bilateral and multilateral donors. For example, Enda Santé works with the Ministry of Health and Action on the SEN/031 Health and Social Protection program co-financed by Luxembourg Development Cooperation Agency. With funding from the EU's European Development Fund, the Ministry of Finance provides financing to CSOs to support the implementation of projects approved under the Support for Civil Society Citizens' Initiatives (PAISC) program.

Private-sector financial support for CSOs is almost nonexistent. Private businesses work directly with communities through their social responsibility programs or foundations.

CSOs that generate income from product sales and other activities saw significant drops in income in 2020, which led to operational instability and lack of payment to employees forced to stay home. The revenues of women's cooperatives working in local grain processing and supported by the COVID-19 crisis response program of the Network of Local Actors and Authorities for the Social and Solidarity Economy (Réseau des acteurs et collectivités territoriales pour l'économie sociale et solidaire, RACTES) also decreased by 55 to 90 percent between March and July 2020.

## ADVOCACY: 3.5


CSO advocacy did not change in 2020.

The year started off positively with the president's launch on January 30 of Senegal's report on the African Peer Review Mechanism, a self-assessment process that allows African states to promote and strengthen high standards of governance. Organizations such as the Senegalese Council of Women (Conseil sénégalais des femmes, COSEF), Council of Development Support NGOs (Conseil des organisations non gouvernementales d'appui au développement, CONGAD), and National Council of Youth of Senegal (Conseil national de la jeunesse du Sénégal, CNJS) participated in the National Governance Commission, which was chaired by the Platform of Non-State Actors of Senegal (Plateforme des acteurs non étatiques du Sénégal, PFAnE). CONGAD, Civil Forum, Federation of Senegalese Women's Associations (Fédération des associations de femmes sénégalaises, FAFS), and National Network of Rural Women in Sénegal (Réseau national des femmes rurales au Sénégal, RNFRS) served on the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council, which allowed them to contribute to the formation of public policies. The Handicap Forum Educ organization, Senegalese Human Rights League (Ligue sénégalaise des droits humains, LSDH), and COSEF were named to the supervisory committee of Force COVID-19 and helped monitor implementation of the Economic and Social Recovery Plan.

Civil society also played a major role in facilitating a dialogue on electoral issues with the majority party and opposition groups. As members of the Political Commission of the National Dialogue Steering Committee, which was charged with promoting all actors' acceptance of a peaceful electoral process, COSCE and PACTE contributed to an audit of the electoral roll with the support of USAID. On the local level, CSOs advocated for transparency and accountability by all local authorities following the example of the partnership between Civil Forum and the Association of Mayors of Senegal regarding citizen certification.

But despite a long tradition of contributing to public policy, only a few large national and international organizations and networks advocated effectively in 2020. The majority of CSOs, particularly smaller women's and youth organizations, lacked the capacity to articulate constructive critiques of public policies. In 2020, restrictions introduced under the state of emergency, combined with CSOs' inability to adapt to online tools such as remote work platforms, prevented many organizations from exercising their right to inform, monitor, and evaluate public policies, according to a report on the management of COVID-19 and the protection of human rights in Senegal by RADDHO. CSOs were also hampered by the absence of a law on access to information, which would facilitate access to government data, especially regarding public budgeting, financial management, and other economic issues. Finally, certain state structures continued to be deaf to CSOs' recommendations, and consultative frameworks set up at the local and sectoral levels were often nonfunctioning.

Nevertheless, CSOs worked closely with local communities to advocate for their needs during the pandemic. For example, after it became clear that local authorities were unable to meet the urgent need for sanitary and food products during the curfew, CSOs successfully pushed the government to adopt Ordinance 16, which allows for the derogation of usual departmental, municipal, and city council operations to facilitate the execution of pandemic-related public orders. Within this context, RACTES and PFAnE collaborated with the City of Dakar to develop a legal framework to facilitate access to public funds by social and solidarity economic organizations, including cooperatives and women's groups, with the support of KOICA and the Global Social Economy Forum. Various civil society coalitions and platforms played a mediating role when tensions arose over pandemic curfews and confinement. For example, the Platform of Women for Peace in Casamance (Plateforme des femmes pour la paix en Casamance, PFPC) and the Unitary Framework of Islam (Cadre unitaire de l'Islam au Sénégal, CUIS), a group of scientific committees of Muslim brotherhoods, introduced initiatives to pacify public space and ease political tensions.



CSOs were also active on gender issues, such as the empowerment of women and recognition of women's rights in public policies, which are articulated in the strategy on equality and gender equity in the Senegalese development program. The Association of Senegalese Jurists, in collaboration with the Heinrich Böll Foundation–Dakar, publicized the steep rise in gender-based violence during the pandemic.

No progress was made in reforming the legal framework governing the sector in 2020. In 2019, the Ministry of Interior had begun to work with CSOs to revise Decree No. 2015-145 at CSOs' urging. CONGAD, the Association of International NGOs (Association des ONG internationales au Sénégal, ONGIS), and other organizations working on the issue reached agreement on the most important items, such as the frequency of submission of reports by NGOs. The proposed revisions were expected to strengthen civil society's role in development and improve its ability to hold the government to account. However, the reform of Decree No. 2015-145 did not progress in 2020. Also in limbo was a proposed framework agreement between NGOs and the government, which, among other things, would change NGOs' relationship with the Ministry of Interior from one of mentoring to a partnership and establish joint mechanisms for consultation and accountability that include NGOs, the territorial administration, decentralized state services, and local communities.

## SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7



CSO service delivery did not change in 2020.

CSOs normally offer services in a broad range of areas, including education, literacy, and youth employability. After the government called on CSOs to implement a community-based strategy to help stop transmission of the virus, some local CSOs were able to quickly stop their usual activities to support the pandemic response. Most organizations were able to redirect funding to short- and medium-term efforts, such as distributing hygienic supplies, food, and awareness-raising materials. Some CSOs implemented new initiatives or worked with other local CSOs to promote their involvement in the pandemic response. For example, under the banner *Kou Nekkag Bossam* (To Each His Own Mask), Alphadev helped out-of-school youth in apprenticeships and craft

workshops make masks and distribute them free of charge in communes, markets, fishing piers, and bus stations. PFAAnE helped sports and cultural CBOs in the central, southern, and western districts of Dakar promote hand washing and other preventative measures at markets and garages, provide protective materials, and produce broadcast spots and sketches to raise awareness about discrimination against COVID-19 patients and former patients. As part of this effort, which took place under USAID's Sunu Election program, some organizations also disseminated awareness-raising visual materials produced by the Ministry of Health.

Organizations such as World Vision helped people directly by providing them with material and financial donations. A group of CSOs provided XOF 55 million (about \$95,000) for the Kaffrine medical region and donated XOF 8 million (approximately \$14,000) to the regional COVID-19 committee, which paid for the distribution of 893 bottles of hand sanitizer, 1,575 pairs of gloves, 483 soap packages, bleach, tarps, informational posters, and other awareness-raising materials. RACTES worked in partnership with the City of Dakar to support women's organizations so that they could produce sanitary kits and raise awareness in women's workplaces and schools. The health-care organizations Senegalese Organization for Familial Wellbeing (Association sénégalaise pour le bien-être familial, ASBEF), Enda Santé, Alima, Therapeutic Solidarity and Health Initiatives (Solidarité thérapeutique et initiatives pour la santé, SOLTHIS), and the Spanish organization Doctors of the World also provided pandemic-related services.

The protection of street children and talibés, or young boys who leave their families to study the Qur'an, was a top priority during the pandemic. Ndeyi Jirim protected talibés from COVID-19 by taking care of them for twenty days, so that they would not have to search for food. The Agir Ensemble coalition, which includes Save the Children, ChildFund, Plan Sénégal, SOS Village d'Enfants, World Vision, Educo, AJS, Alliance for Solidarity, National

Coalition of Associations and NGOs for Children (Coalition nationale des associations et ONG en faveur de l'enfant, CONAFE), and the Spanish organization Alianza por la Solidaridad, were able to quickly set up the *AarXaley* (Let's Protect Children) campaign to protect children against health risks and violence. These measures were often accompanied by awareness-raising activities on radio and posters. Many CSOs used KoBo Toolbox to plan and monitor activities in the pandemic context.

CSOs generally provide goods and services without regard to race, gender, ethnic group, sexual orientation, or other factors. Membership associations often seek to provide goods and services to people other than their own members. Although some organizations try to cover their operating costs by charging for services, such efforts are challenging for Senegalese CSOs.

The government generally recognizes CSOs' contributions in service provision. Government ministers often attend CSOs' events. For example, the secretary of state for the promotion of human rights and good governance worked alongside CSOs on the national joint committee for the Open Governance Partnership, which promotes public-sector transparency. The country's president spoke with civil society representatives such as PFAnE and 3D about fighting the pandemic together, which resulted in CSOs' involvement in efforts to reduce the spread of the virus, promote preventative measures, and take part in the Force COVID-19 monitoring committee.

## SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.5


The infrastructure supporting CSOs deteriorated slightly in 2020 because of the weak support offered by resource centers and other sources of infrastructural support.

The financial and technical support offered by resource centers decreased in 2020 because of pandemic restrictions. Many activities were canceled or reduced. For example, WEIGO cancelled 90 percent of planned activities and nearly 60 percent of its financial support to CSOs under its Dakar Focal City program, which provides technical and financial support to organizations working in trash recovery, artisanal workshops, and the informal sector.

Existing networks and platforms, such as PFAnE, CONGAD, and other thematic networks, normally offer their members information and training and coordinate their activities. But in 2020, they had to cancel or cut back on such activities because of the pandemic. For example, when local elections were delayed because of the pandemic, PFAnE had to cancel all CSO support activities, including training and education. At the same time, several new platforms emerged to offer pandemic-related services. For example, CSO members of the main umbrella organizations set up the Senegalese NGO Umbrella Organizations' Partnership Framework (CAPFONG), which aims to pool strategies and resources to support the state and HIV/AIDS populations affected by COVID-19. CAPFONG strengthened coordination among its member CSOs so that they could participate effectively in the pandemic response while ensuring their own sustainability. CAPFONG also developed an action plan with recommendations for post-COVID-19 Senegal, emphasizing that priorities are likely to change and new forms of organizations and new content in their community interventions are likely to emerge.


Support entities such as WEIGO, CECI, Quebec Entrepreneurs' School, and PFONGUE adapted to the pandemic mainly by introducing remote work arrangements and webinars. Many international CSOs' capacity-building and training activities for local CSOs moved to videoconference platforms such as Zoom and Google Meet. For example, CECI stopped its in-person activities and used Zoom to conduct training for women's CSOs and CSO networks.

The COVID-19 pandemic helped break down boundaries between sectors as multi-stakeholder projects expanded. National and international CSOs partnered with local CSOs to promote their involvement in the government's pandemic response and emergency funding mechanisms. For example, PFONGUE, through its Jokkale project,



facilitated the efforts of working groups of international and domestic CSOs to conduct a collective analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 crisis in Senegal. The consultative process offered assessments to government, private-sector, and financial and technical partners on the impact of the pandemic on rural development and food security, essential services and urban and regional planning, employability and economic development, and social sectors, particularly vulnerable populations. The EU continued to build the capacity of networks and platforms to contribute to governance in such sectors as natural resource management, sustainable agricultural development, youth employment, and transparency and accountability in the framework of its Civil Society Support Program. The private sector cooperates with CSOs mostly through PFAnE, which is a cooperative framework for the private sector and civil society, including unions.

## PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6



The public image of CSOs did not change in 2020.

CSOs' activities benefited from good coverage and satisfactory treatment by the private media outlets in 2020. For example, all of the press conferences, press releases, marches, and demonstrations sponsored by advocacy organizations such as Ñoo Lank, FRAPP-France, Aar Li NuBokk, Fed Up, 3D, PFAnE, and RADDHO were covered by traditional and social media, whose coverage was generally objective. CSOs' activities are still poorly covered or not covered at all by public media, especially national television and radio.

The public generally has a positive opinion of CSOs. Beneficiaries often commend CSOs for their work in improving community living conditions and advocating for the social and economic well-being of vulnerable groups.

The public also appreciates the work of CSOs in defending their rights. Although in the early stage of the pandemic CSOs were not very visible as they reoriented their activities and negotiated with donors to reallocate funds, they were eventually seen as playing a significant role in the pandemic response and augmenting the central government's strategy to stop the spread of COVID-19.

The government generally has a favorable opinion of CSOs. Civil society's positive involvement in implementing the government's community COVID-19 prevention strategy strengthened this perception. For example, on multiple occasions the minister of health invited all CSO to be involved in fighting the pandemic at the national, regional, and departmental levels.

Given pandemic restrictions, CSOs had to find other ways to spread their messages in 2020. Many organizations relied on videoconferencing, telecommuting, social networks, and the distribution of brochures. CSOs such as PFAnE, COSCE, and 3D conducted a media campaign through diverse traditional, social, and community media with support from USAID. Under the program, CSOs produced and broadcast shows on preventing the virus and fighting discrimination. Some organizations were helped in this effort by their strong relationships with community leaders, neighborhood representatives, market managers, and transportation collective managers, who helped spread the message about COVID-19 prevention measures. Public feedback allowed CSOs to make improvements in their communications strategies about COVID-19 and successfully promote community acceptance of restrictions aimed at preventing the spread of the virus.

Senegalese CSOs still lack a self-regulatory mechanism. A draft CSO charter initiated by national CSOs in 2018 is still in the idea stage and thus has yet to help promote the sector's credibility and sustainability. CSOs' narrative and financial reports are mostly intended for financial partners, and publications about their work for public consumption are few.

***Disclaimer:*** The opinions expressed herein are those of the panelists and other project researchers and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or FHI 360.

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